Medical Air Solutions, LLC

An Interagency Working Group (IWG) sponsored by the Office of Homeland Security and the Office of Science and Technology Policy developed these guidelines. The agencies participating in the IWG are listed in Appendix A to these Guidelines. GSA is issuing these guidelines as part of its responsibilities to the federal mail management community under the Federal Records Act (44 U.S.C 2904).

GSA and the IWG intend these guidelines for use primarily by:

Others who may find these guidelines useful include mail center workers, federal executives responsible for mail center operations, federal workers who handle mail outside of mail centers, and the general public.

The IWG wrote these guidelines for federal agencies in the DC metro area, which includes the city of Washington, DC, and the Maryland and Virginia counties that immediately surround it. The guidelines focus on the DC area because federal agencies in and around Washington are at the highest risk from a new anthrax attack. The IWG will, in the near future, revise these guidelines to address the needs of federal activities nationwide.

First responders have identified five categories into which almost all anthrax threats fall. The appropriate action, specified below, depends on the category:

1.  A mail piece (i.e., an unopened letter or package delivered by the US Postal Service (USPS) or another carrier), which has been irradiated and x-rayed, looks suspicious according to established criteria (see Appendix B to this document for the standard list of suspicious characteristics).

The recommended protocol for managing credible threats in the Washington, DC Metropolitan area is provided in Appendix C to this document.

2.  A unopened mail piece look suspicious, and it has been x-rayed but not irradiated.

If the addressee does not recognize the package, follow the recommended protocol for managing credible threats (Appendix C) and call the appropriate law enforcement authority.

3. A unopened mail piece looks suspicious, and it has not been x-rayed or irradiated.

As above, a supervisor or designated person should confirm that the mail piece meets the established criteria for a suspicious mail piece. And, as above, the addressee should be asked to identify the mail piece. If the addressee does not identify it, follow the recommended protocol (Appendix C) and call the appropriate law enforcement authority.

Note: Items 1 through 3 on this list are also displayed graphically in Appendix D to this document "Decision Tree For Handling Mail in DC-Area Federal Mail Centers."

4. A letter or package of unknown origin (i.e., not delivered by an established carrier to a mail center) looks suspicious.

5. Unidentified powder -- no association with a letter or package and no other indications of a threat.

Call appropriate law enforcement or other qualified security personnel. If the law enforcement officer determines that the threat is not credible, trained maintenance personnel should be directed to clean up the material as appropriate. If the law enforcement officer determines that the threat is credible, follow the protocol in Appendix C.

The purpose of the "Technical Assistance for Anthrax Response" is to help protect public health and safety by providing the most current information available throughout the federal government, and sharing national experience to date in responding to releases of B. anthracis. The "Technical Assistance for Anthrax Response" will be available in the near future through a password-protected website. To inquire about access, please see http://www.nrt.org/.

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has released guidance on use of these methods. A copy of this guidance is attached as Appendix E. DHHS has also provided the following table to address performance characteristics of the various test methods indicating that the effectiveness of these methods is unsatisfactory.

In response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, Federal agencies have asked whether environmental sampling is necessary to protect federal workers. Analysis of the available scientific evidence, and experience since last October 2001 indicate that routine sampling is unnecessary because:

Any facility that is considering routine sampling should consider the following factors in making this decision:

After performing a risk assessment, if a federal facility still deems it necessary to implement routine sampling, a sampling plan must be developed in close coordination with medical, environmental, public health, and industrial hygiene professionals who are familiar with environmental sampling methods, public health impacts, and worker safety issues related to anthrax. For specific information about sampling procedures, see "Comprehensive Procedures for Collecting Environmental Samples for Culturing Bacillus anthracis, Revised April 2002, which is available at www.cdc.gov/niosh/unp-envsamp.html. This CDC document emphasizes culturing all samples at an LRN-member laboratory.

Security planning: The new Federal Management Regulation, 41 CFR, Part 102-192, Mail Management, states, "Every Federal agency and agency location where an agency has one or more full time personnel processing mail must implement a written mail security plan." This regulation was published in the Federal Register on June 6, 2002. It should be noted that 41 CFR, Part 101-9, which was replaced by the new regulation, included a similar requirement. GSA has published a "Mail Center Manager’s Security Guide" on its website, at www.gsa.gov/mailpolicy to assist agencies with security planning. Every security plan should be reviewed periodically by an external resource, such as the Federal Protective Service.

Security assessment: Security planning starts with a security assessment, conducted by a qualified expert. Security assessment is very site-specific; it will provide different results for every location. The "Mail Center Manager’s Security Guide" includes a list of resources for security assessments.

Gloves, masks/respirators, and protective clothing: Gloves and masks/respirators should be made available for any mail center workers or others who process mail, because wearing gloves or a mask eases the fears of some workers, and gloves protect against the dusts generated by irradiation. They are not necessary for protection from anthrax or other threats, except in areas where large volumes of mail are processed on high-speed equipment. Other protective clothing is unnecessary except to protect workers clothing from dust and other dirt. Where respirators are used, they are subject to the requirements of OSHA’s respiratory protection standard (29 CFR 1910.134).

Mail center design: All but the smallest mail centers should be placed in enclosed rooms, with defined points of entry. Wherever the security assessment, mail volumes, and cost considerations make it appropriate, the mail center should have its own air handling and ventilation system, including HEPA filters in most cases. Separating the air handling system protects the rest of the facility from anthrax and many other threats that may be delivered in the mail, and HEPA filters help protect mail center workers from the dusty products of irradiation as well as many different threats. Note that Recommendation 4, above, indicates that the filters should not be sampled routinely for anthrax contamination.

General inbound mail processing guidelines: All mail delivered to federal agencies should be x-rayed by trained personnel, except in the smallest locations. In those small locations where volume does not support this, consider partnering with another facility or with headquarters to x-ray. All deliveries from couriers and express carriers other than the USPS (e.g., FedEx) should be x-rayed as well. Where it is practical, the inbound mail operation should be separated from the rest of the mail center’s operations (e.g., retail, outgoing mail).

Training and rehearsal: Education and awareness are the essential ingredients to preparedness. Mail center employees must remain aware of their surroundings and the mail pieces they handle. Effective training will develop a culture of security awareness. Every security plan should discuss how new and current mail center workers will be trained and how they will rehearse various plans and scenarios.

Internal communications: Many people who work in federal facilities are still very frightened of anthrax. It is critical, therefore, that all internal communications about anthrax contamination be timely, clear, consistent, and factual. Every security plan should specify the agency managers and agency public affairs officials who will coordinate all internal communications in the event of a positive laboratory culture. Security plans should also ensure that:

External communications: The recent terrorist attacks have shown that the American people rely on the federal government for a great many things. Even a suggestion of anthrax contamination in a federal facility can lead people to wonder whether the affected federal agency can still provide the services they need. It is critical, therefore, that all external communications be timely, clear, consistent, and factual, just as with internal communications. For external communications, each security plan should also:

Describe how local public health and local law enforcement officials will be included in the communications process.

Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Office of Legal Enforcement Standards (OLES)

Department of Defense

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)

Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC)

Department of Health and Human Services

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Laboratory Response Network (LRN)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)

Office of Emergency Preparedness

Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

National Institute of Justice (NIJ)

General Services Administration (GSA)

Federal Protective Service (FPS)

Office of Governmentwide Policy (OGP)

Office of Homeland Security (OHS)

Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

United States Postal Service (USPS)

Postal Inspection Service (USPIS)

Characteristics of a suspicious package or letter vary, depending upon the types of mail that your operation routinely processes. That is, what is suspicious in one mail center is not necessarily suspicious in another. However, anything from the following list that is unusual, in terms or your normal mail, or multiple items from this list, should draw the attention of your employees.

Characteristics of suspicious packages or letters include:

Every mail processing location should have at least two signs posted, in a place that makes them easy to read. One sign should specify the appropriate law enforcement to call in the event of an emergency, and the other should provide a list of suspicious characteristics (such as the FBI poster above). In most federally owned buildings and leased buildings occupied entirely by federal tenants, the appropriate law enforcement is the Federal Protective Service. In others, it may be the agency’s own law enforcement or the local police.

A law enforcement officer, with the appropriate training and equipment, should evaluate every apparently credible anthrax threat.

1. If you have identified a suspicious letter, package, or object: