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by W. J. Kowalski, PE, PhD - Penn State
University
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Recent events have exposed the
vulnerability of our cities and infrastructure to attacks by suicidal fanatics
who are determined to cause mass destruction and inflict record numbers of
casualties. Airplane security may have been tightened, but various
opportunities for such attacks remain open to any single-minded individuals
bent on taking revenge for US foreign policy or the actions of our allies.
High profile terrorist attacks and mass casualties would
seem to
be the order of America's future, and until the root causes are addressed and
resolved, it will be up to designers, engineers, and building managers to
prepare as best they can for the worst possible consequences.
Of all the activities that could be undertaken by
terrorists in the attempt to gain world attention, perhaps none has the
potential for causing as many mass casualties as the use of biological and
chemical weapons. This report summarizes the basics of biological weapons (BW)
and what measures might be taken to protect buildings.
Most microorganisms that cause
disease or produce toxins may be used as biological weapons, and these include
viruses, bacteria, fungal spores, and toxins, but not all will cause
casualties or even infections. Toxins are biological poisons and may include
those produced by bacteria, called endotoxins, or those produce by fungi,
called mycotoxins.
Not all of these agents would
necessarily be effective, as some have low infection rates, or are unlikely to
cause fatalities or incapacitation. Table 1 lists all of the major biological
weapon (BW) agents that have ever been used, developed, or mentioned as
biological weapons in the literature (see References).

Chemical Weapons
Table 2 lists all those chemical weapons which
are considered by the various indicated references to be prime choices as
chemical weapon (CW) agents. Some of these agents have been used previously in
both war and terrorism.

Release Mechanisms
Two basic types of disseminators are possible for
both chemical and biological weapons. The aerosolizer is a spraying device
that comes in many forms and can be used to spray a liquid or a powder into
the air. Microorganisms in liquid form would be aerosolized by such a
mechanism. Toxins in powdered or liquid form could also be aerosolized,
provided they are ground to sufficiently small sizes.
Aerosolizers can be powered by
pressurized gas, such as CO2 or air, to produce vapors. They can also use
techniques such as ultrasonic atomizers or “spinning top” aerosolizers to
produce clouds of vapor. Although atomization might reduce water to molecules,
microbes would be reduced to elementary bacteria, viruses, or clumps of the
same. The aerosolization process can destroy some or all of the microbes,
depending the species fragility, pressure, and nozzle type.
Most chemicals tend to
evaporate under normal room temperature and pressure, so pressurized
mechanisms may not be necessary. anyway. Such was the approach used by the Aum
Shinrikyo cult in Japan. The potential for mass destruction inherent in the
use of chemical weapons is eclipsed by the potential of biological weapons.
Although more difficult to create, biological weapons have an order of
magnitude more destructive potential on a per mass basis.
Bombs for disseminating
chemicals or biological agents can be driven by two mechanisms – explosives or
pressurized gas. The main problem with using explosives is that explosives
tend to destroy the BW agents. The approach used by Iraq, the Soviets, and the
Japanese when they constructed anthrax bombs was to use a slow detonating
explosive.
Dissemination in the outdoor
air is considered the least likely scenario due to the quantities that would
be required, and the fact that wind would tend to disperse airborne agents to
harmless concentrations in short order. Such was the case with the Aum
Shinrikyo cult; their attempts to disperse anthrax outdoors all failed.
Dissemination in buildings
The most likely approach that would be used by
terrorists would be to employ an aerosolizer to release the agents, either
into the ventilation duct or into general areas of the building. Release of a
BW agent on a single floor would heavily contaminate that floor, as
illustrated in Figure 2, but the remaining floors would see much lower
concentrations since the agent would arrive from the supply duct in lower
concentrations. Both the mixture of normal outside air and the passage through
the air handling unit would tend to reduce contminant levels in the supply
air. Figure 2: Explosive release of a BW Agent in one zone of a building would
result in heavy local contamination but have less effect on other floors.

Figure 2: Explosive or slow release of a BW
agent in a building would recirculate throughout the ventilation system.
Passive dissemination of
toxins and pathogens is another possibility. An agent like anthrax could be
dusted on interior surfaces where aerial dispersion would result. Terrorists
would be likely to contaminate themselves by such an act, but may not care.
Anthrax is one of the few BW
agents for which infectious properties are known. The ID50, or dose that would
infect 50% of exposed people, is 10,000 spores (Cieslak 1999). The LD50, or
lethal dose for 50% of people, is 28000 spores (Inglesby 1999). The figure
below illustrates how varying doses of inhaled anthrax spores might impact a
population. It is based on a normal bell curve distribution with a standard
deviation of 1.0.

The filtration of anthrax spores can be predicted using the
logmean diameter of 1.12 microns, or more precisely, by using the full size
distribution curve (Kowalski et al 1999). The UVGI rate constant for anthrax
spores on surfaces is approximately 0.000031 cm2/microW-s (Knudson 1986, Dietz
1980). The airborne rate constant is not known but can be extrapolated. The
decay curve for anthrax spores is typically a two stage curve with a shoulder.
Explosive dispersion inside a building is one possible
approach that terrorists may use, but this would cause immediate alarm and
mitigate the effects. The most likely approach would be to use an aerosolizer
to release the agents into the return air ventilation duct or air handling
unit.
Immune Building Technology
The principle behind immune building technology is to
integrate the ventilation system, the building envelope, detection and control
systems, zone isolation systems, and air treatment systems so as to provide
maximum protection to building occupants. Much of the technology may be
advanced and expensive to implement, but when scaled down such approaches can
lead to commercial building systems that protect occupants not only against BW
agents but also against naturally occurring airborne diseases. Immune building
technology may consist of proven technologies like dilution ventilation,
filtration, and UVGI, and developmental technologies like PCO, pulsed light,
and biosensors.
The effect of any building ventilation system is to
recirculate airborne contaminants and purge them over time. Most buildings
bring in some 20-25% outside air and mix it with recirculated air. Most
buildings do not use any kind of filters, other than dust filters, or any air
treatment systems. Although the use of high efficiency filtration or UVGI
systems would not have much effect at the point of release of an agent, it
would have a major effect on any contaminants that were recirculated. The
result would be that casualties in other areas of the building would be
reduced. The results of the study on a simulated anthrax attack on a 50 story
building in Figure 3 indicate that even a modest system composed of (non-HEPA)
filters and UVGI lamps is capable of seriously diminishing the impact of any
biological weapons attack.

Figure 3: Inhaled Dose after a simulated Anthrax Attack on a 50 story
building.
The cost of implementing air treatment systems must be
weighed against the actual risk. Of course, the risk can’t be readily
estimated for any given building, and so a more practical approach is simply
to allocate a budget for such systems. A system based on filtration, UVGI,
increased outside air flowrate (with energy-saving heat exchangers), or other
technologies (i.e. PCO) could then be sized to provide some minimal level of
building immunity.
Addendum: Anthrax in the Mail Passive distribution
of anthrax in the mail has raised the question of how this might be defended
against. UV irradiation can be used to sterilize the outside surface of
envelopes with an exposure of 2-30 minutes, depending on the intensity of the
UV lamp and the distance the envelope sits from the lamp. Typical medical or
dental equipment UV sterilization units can be used for this purpose.
Alternatively, a typical 1420W 2450 MHz microwave oven can
be used to sterilize mail (Cavalcante & Muchovej 1993). Since the microwaves
penetrate paper they sterilize the inside and the outside of the envelope. It
takes longer, perhaps 30-50 minutes, and can start a fire if the envelope
contains any metal (i.e. charge cards, reflective tape, or CDs), but may be a
convenient option for concerned citizens. Suspect mail should be bagged
immediately, them microwaved.
Decontamination of buildings in which anthrax tainted mail
has been found can be accomplished using chemical disinfectants or even ozone
(Hibben et al 1969, Ishizaki et al 1986). Buildings can be pumped full of the
vapors or gases and left to sit for hours or days, then exhausted to
atmosphere. Ozone will, however, destroy some organic materials like rubber.


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